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Rosalind Dillon
INTRODUCTION

The Hole. Segregation. Isolation. Supermax. Lockdown. Special Housing Unit.
Restrictive Housing Unit. These are terms used to describe the practice referred to in this
Comment as solitary confinement, each evoking a slightly different idea of what it means
to lock someone alone in a concrete or steel box for days, weeks, months, years, and
sometimes decades on end. “The Hole” paints a grim picture of a dark and lonely place
without a chance for escape. “Special Housing Unit” is vague, but ultimately puts a
prettier gloss on the practice of extreme isolation. While each term may elicit slightly
different feelings among those unfamiliar with what happens inside jail and prison walls,
the horrific effects of prolonged and extreme isolation1 on persons with mental illness2
are hauntingly consistent.
The medical and scientific communities are in overwhelming agreement:
prolonged solitary confinement has devastating effects on persons suffering from mental
illness.3 Indeed, the practice has devastating effects on those who are not afflicted by
mental illness. Why then, in a country as developed as the United States, is the practice of
placing mentally ill prisoners in extreme and prolonged isolation so pervasive? The
reasons are many, but this Comment focuses on the idea of “harm” and how the failure to
treat psychological harm as seriously as physical harm erects barriers, which prevent
mentally ill persons from getting relief from the torture of solitary confinement.
Every year prisons throw people, many of whom suffer from debilitating mental
illness, into the hole and never look back. According to the Eighth Amendment,
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”4 Prisoners attempting to challenge their solitary
confinement via the Eighth Amendment must meet a two part test: (1) the conditions of
confinement must be objectively serious or prisoners must allege they have a sufficiently
serious medical need; and (2) prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to the harm,
or potential future harm, caused by that condition or medical need.5 The failure to treat
For the sake of this Comment, “prolonged” solitary confinement refers to the practice of confining anyone
in extreme isolation for a period longer than fifteen days. “Extreme isolation” refers to the denial of
meaningful contact with other human beings and sensory deprivation that prisoners housed in solitary
confinement experience between twenty-two and twenty-four hours per day.
2
When it comes to prisoners suffering from mental illness, I use the broad definition from the Protection
and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI) Act. Under the PAIMI Act, an “individual with
mental illness” is an individual “who has a significant mental illness or emotional impairment, as
determined by a mental health professional qualified under the laws and regulations of the State . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 10802(4)(A) (2012). “Significant mental illness” and “emotional impairment” are not further
defined in the PAIMI Act or its implementing regulations. However, courts have generally favored a broad
definition of these terms. See Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Hartford
Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp.2d 649, 655 (D. Conn. 2005), aff'd, 464 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006); ANNA GUY,
AVID PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN: SEGREGATION OF INMATES WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 5 n.5 (2016).
3
See infra Part II.
4
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
5
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825–26 (1970). Prisoners may also challenge their placement in solitary
confinement through the Fourteenth Amendment, but this Comment focuses on the Eight Amendment. See,
e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476 (1995) (procedural due process challenge to solitary
confinement).
1
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psychological pain in the same manner as physical pain—for example, by determining
prisoners are feigning mental illness or are malingering when they commit acts of selfharm—has made it more difficult for prisoners suffering from mental illness to bring
successful Eighth Amendment claims.
Various provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) further serve to
hinder successful challenges to solitary confinement. Under the Act, even if a prisoner
with mental illness could otherwise bring a successful Eighth Amendment claim, he or
she is sometimes barred from doing so by the three strikes provision.6 The three strikes
provision of the PLRA requires prisoners who have filed three or more claims deemed
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim to prove an “imminent danger of serious
physical injury” in order to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in federal court.7 This forces
prisoners to advocate that their psychological pain and manifestations of mental illness
constitute serious physical injury. Further, prisoner litigants alleging mental injury are
barred from recovering compensatory damages, leaving limited avenues for relief and
frustrating the ability of prisoners to retain counsel because of limitations on attorney fee
awards.8 As this Comment will demonstrate, consensus in the scientific community
suggests the distinction between serious psychological and physical harm is blurry at
best. Therefore, a bright line cannot and should not be drawn.
There is a strong argument, with growing support, that the practice of prolonged
solitary confinement of any prisoner should be abolished as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.9 While the movement to
abolish solitary confinement is an important initiative, the scope of this Comment is
limited to the argument that the practice of solitary confinement is categorically
inappropriate for people suffering from mental illness. This argument is consistent with
research that overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that placing a person with mental
illness in solitary confinement causes consistent, and sometimes irreversible,
psychological and physical harm.10
This Comment analyzes the failure of the judiciary to treat psychological and
physical harm with the same level of seriousness, which has precluded prisoners from
making successful Eighth Amendment claims, especially “three strikes” prisoners. Part I
provides a historical background and general overview of the conditions and the
population of prisoners found in solitary confinement. Part II analyzes the physiological
and psychological effects of solitary confinement on people with mental illness. Part III
reveals that there is a blurred line between physical and psychological harm, and,
therefore, argues that courts should treat them as similarly serious. Part IV outlines the
legal framework in which challenges to solitary confinement operate and the legal
consequences of treating psychological harm differently than physical harm. Ultimately, I
6

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
§ 1915(g).
8
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)–(e) (2012).
9
See Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and Far Too
Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 745 (2015).
10
See generally Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement,
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130 (2003) [hereinafter Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary
Confinement]; Craig Haney, Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 285,
299–301 (2018) [hereinafter Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement].
7
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conclude that placing people who suffer from mental illness in solitary confinement
cannot be squared with the Eighth Amendment. I also argue that, at minimum, the way in
which courts treat physical harm as more serious than psychological harm must change to
offer greater protection of prisoners’ right to humane conditions of confinement.
I.
A.

WHAT IS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT?

Brief History and Mounting Concern Over the Effects of Solitary Confinement

The horrific reality of solitary confinement’s effects on human beings is well
documented. Solitary confinement in the United States is traceable to the late seventeenth
century when the Walnut Street Jail11 attempted to apply a new theory of punishment
which placed the “worst type of felons” in solitary cells.12 The idea to experiment with
solitary confinement stemmed from the Quaker belief that prisoners isolated in cells with
only a Bible could use that time to reflect, repent, pray, and eventually reform.13 While
the practice was a failure at Walnut Street, at least in part due to overcrowding,14 the
Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia revived the practice in 1829. 15 In 1842, Charles
Dickens toured the Eastern State Penitentiary and wrote:
In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind, humane, and meant for
reformation; but I am persuaded that those who devised this system of
Prison Discipline, and those benevolent gentlemen who carry it into
execution, do not know what they are doing. I believe that very few men
are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony which
this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers.16
The practice was slowly abandoned in subsequent decades due to the number of prisoners
who went insane, committed suicide, or were no longer able to function in society. 17 By
1890 the Supreme Court recognized the “serious objections” to extended solitary
confinement, understanding the effects on prisoners were grave, including “violent
insanity” and suicide, and that “in most cases [prisoners] did not recover sufficient mental
activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”18
Today, concern about the effects of prolonged solitary confinement continues to
grow. Activists and organizations against solitary confinement urge that the practice
Walnut Street Jail, located across the street from Independence Hall in Philadelphia, was Pennsylvania’s
first penitentiary. LeRoy B. DePuy, The Walnut Street Prison: Pennsylvania’s First Penitentiary, 18 PA.
HIST. 130, 130 (1951).
12
Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
35, 48 (1921).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Laura Sullivan, Timeline: Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, NPR (July 26, 2006, 7:52 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5579901.
16
CHARLES DICKENS, Philadelphia, and Its Solitary Prison, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS:
AMERICAN NOTES 96, 98 (1911).
17
Sullivan, supra note 15.
18
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
11
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amounts to torture and should be abolished.19 The concern is global—the UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture specifically condemned solitary confinement as torture and urged
an absolute prohibition on the practice in excess of fifteen days.20 Former Justice
Kennedy, concurring in Davis v. Ayala, asserted that research describing the side-effects
of solitary confinement—anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and
suicidal thoughts and behaviors—confirmed “what [the Supreme] Court suggested over a
century ago: Years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”21 Following
former Justice Kennedy’s lead, Justice Breyer, writing in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross,
referenced peer-reviewed material documenting that “prolonged solitary confinement
produces numerous deleterious harms,” both physical and psychological. 22 Most recently,
Justice Sotomayor wrote of the well-known harms of solitary, urging courts and
corrections officials to “remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by
keeping prisoners in solitary confinement,” and describing solitary as a “penal tomb.”23
Although concern is mounting, this concern, absent concrete and meaningful action,
means little for those suffering from mental illness trapped in solitary confinement across
the country.
B.

“Typical” Conditions of Confinement

Solitary confinement refers to “the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal
to rare meaningful contact with other individuals.”24 The actual conditions of solitary
confinement vary by institution. However, every solitary confinement regime maintains
certain consistent features—small spaces, minimal and meaningless human interaction,
and overexposure to negative stimuli such as noxious smells from feces, urine and blood;
loud banging; and the screaming and echoing of other prisoners in solitary.25

19

See generally SCARLET KIM ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE COST OF
EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS (2012),
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf; Stop Solitary: No Time
to Lose, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/solitary-confinement/we-can-stopsolitary?redirect=stop-solitary-dangerous-overuse-solitary-confinement-united-states-0 (last visited Feb.
10, 2018); Stop Torture Campaign, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/stop-torture/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018); Torture in U.S. Prisons, NAT’L RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TORTURE,
http://www.nrcat.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); N.Y. CAMPAIGN FOR ALTERNATIVES TO ISOLATED
CONFINEMENT, http://nycaic.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
20
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
23, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (August 5, 2011), available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/268.
21
135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325 (2006)).
22
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015).
23
Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 10 (2018).
24
Solitary Confinement (Isolation): Definition, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
http://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
25
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of
Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. L. REV. 1,
39 n.217 (2012); Nathaniel Penn, Buried Alive: Stories From Inside Solitary Confinement, GQ (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.gq.com/story/buried-alive-solitary-confinement.
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Solitary confinement cells are typically designed to isolate prisoners from
virtually all human contact.26 Prisoners are confined to their cells with almost nothing to
occupy their time between twenty-two and twenty-four hours a day.27 Cells generally
range in size from sixty to eighty square feet—about the size of a parking space—and
many do not have windows.28 Prison staff serve meals through a slot or “chuck hole” in
the door to minimize human interaction.29 The few opportunities prisoners have outside
of their cells do not offer the opportunity for meaningful human interaction or exposure
to environmental stimuli.30 Further, to take advantage of these few opportunities outside
of their cell, many prisoners must submit to an invasive cavity strip-search—every single
time these prisoners exit their cell, they are strip-searched.31 Sometimes prisoners are
escorted from their cell for an hour of exercise, usually only on weekdays, if at all, in a
fenced or walled yard segregated from other prisoners.32 Other institutions have exercise
“cages” adjoining the cells that can be opened remotely by prison staff.33 Some prisoners
in solitary may be allowed to have visitors, but generally may only communicate through
a Plexiglas barrier to prevent any physical contact.34 Most prisons allow some books and
legal papers in the cell, and some permit prisoners to send and receive letters, but often
with restrictions.35 Some prisons also allow for the cells to have radios or televisions.36
Finally, solitary confinement units overexpose prisoners to negative stimuli, including
officers and prisoners shouting, slamming doors, foul smells and sights such as urine,
feces, blood, garbage, and constant fluorescent lighting.37 The period of time that
prisoners are kept in such extreme isolation and in these grim conditions ranges from
days to decades.38

26

Jean Casella & Sal Rodriguez, What Is Solitary Confinement?, GUARDIAN (N.Y.) (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/27/what-is-solitary-confinement.
27
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213–14, 223–24 (2005); Haney, Restricting Solitary
Confinement, supra note 10, at 304.
28
Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 127.
29
David H. Cloud et al., Public Health and Solitary Confinement in the United States, 105 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 18, 20 (2015).
30
Peter Scharf Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review
of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 448–49 (2006).
31
See e.g., Lewis Beale, The Agony of Solitary Confinement: It’s Like Being ‘Buried Alive,’ Prisoners Say,
DAILY BEAST (April 13, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-agony-of-solitary-confinement-its-likebeing-buried-alive-prisoners-say; Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law; Mark Joseph Stern, Solitary
Confinement Is a Great American Shame, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2017/02/the-time-is-right-for-the-supreme-court-to-rein-in-solitary-confinement.html.
32
HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 7 (Jean Casella et al. eds., 2016).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Cloud et al., supra note 29, at 22; Hafemeister & George, supra note 25, at 39 n.217.
38
Casella & Rodriguez, supra note 26.
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Who is Kept in Solitary Confinement?

People with mental illness are dramatically overrepresented in United States
prisons and jails.39 In the wake of deinstitutionalization,40 prisons and jails have become
the nation’s largest inpatient psychiatric centers.41 In 2012, the Treatment Advocacy
Center estimated that more than 350,000 people with a serious mental illness were
housed in prisons and jails, while a tenth of this population (about 35,000) were in state
mental hospitals.42 Many people suffering from mental illness find their way into prisons
on relatively minor charges; however, once incarcerated, they rack up additional charges
“as they act out because of untreated illness, and end up spending a lifetime of cycling in
and out of jail.”43
The number of people held in solitary confinement in the United States is difficult
to determine.44 Estimates suggest that between 80,000 to 100,000 people in U.S. prisons
were held in restrictive housing in 2014,45 which does not include people held in local
jails, juvenile facilities, or military and immigration detention centers.46 Human Rights
Watch estimated, based on available state data, that one-third to one-half of people held
in isolation had some form of mental illness.47 Even under conservative estimates,
solitary confinement cells are used to warehouse tens of thousands of people with mental
illness.48
It is not surprising that those with mental illness are disproportionally confined to
solitary confinement. Once in prison, many prisoners suffering from mental illness have
difficulty conforming their conduct to the many disciplinary rules and to the restrictive
prison environment.49 Additionally, the decision to send prisoners to solitary confinement

Rebecca Vallas, Disabled Behind Bars: The Mass Incarceration of People with Disabilities in America’s
Jails and Prisons, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 18, 2016, 12:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/07/18/141447/disabled-behindbars/.
40
Dae-Young Kim, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Prison Population Growth: A Critical Literature
Review and Its Implications, 27 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3, 6 (2016) (explaining that deinstitutionalization
is the “process of shifting mental health care for the mentally ill to community-based outpatient facilities,
thereby reducing the population of state mental hospitals”).
41
Id. at 8.
42
E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 6 (2014),
http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars.pdf.
43
HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE, supra note 32, at 9.
44
Valerie Kiebala & Sal Rodriguez, FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH (2018), https://solitarywatch.org/facts/faq/.
45
Restrictive housing includes administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, and protective custody,
all of which are forms of solitary confinement. ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, YALE LAW SCH., TIME-INCELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1–2
(2015).
46
Id. at 2.
47
SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 147 (2003).
48
Id.
49
Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A
Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 105 (2010).
39

272

Vol. 14:1]

Rosalind Dillon

is left to the discretion of the prison staff and is open to abuse.50 Prisoners are often sent
to solitary confinement for acts like attempting suicide, failing to obey an order properly,
or even “reckless eyeballing.”51 Consequently, many prisoners with pre-existing mental
health conditions find their way into solitary because of behavior associated with their
mental illness.52 Once in solitary, the extreme isolation serves to exacerbate mental health
issues, or even bring them out in prisoners who never exhibited them before.53
People with mental illness may also find themselves in solitary confinement for
non-disciplinary reasons.54 Protective custody, which often includes solitary
confinement-like conditions, theoretically exists to shield vulnerable populations from
abuse in general-population settings.55 While separation from the general-population may
be necessary to protect some vulnerable prisoners, it does not justify placement in solitary
confinement. The National Prison Rape Elimination Act Resource Center (NPRC)56
issued a report in 2015 that found “[i]nmates with serious mental illness are among the
populations who are often placed in segregated housing for protection . . . in units with
the same intensive security procedures, levels of isolation, restricted human interactions,
and reduced access to programs” despite having no disciplinary violations or threats to
staff or others.57
The overrepresentation of prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary
confinement should concern courts, legislators, and the general public alike. Solitary
confinement is, by design, a particularly cruel form of punishment—the withholding of
all meaningful human contact and positive environmental stimuli is beyond what most
people can comprehend. As the next Part shows, prisoners with mental illness are at a
heightened risk of succumbing to the well-documented psychological and physical harms
of being confined in such a manner.

50

Keramet Reiter, Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: Deference, Discretion, and
Double Bunking, 1986–2010, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 89, 91 (2015).
51
See Annalisa Merelli, These Are Some of the Reasons U.S. Prisoners Wind Up in Solitary Confinement,
QUARTZ (Aug. 15, 2015), https://qz.com/480015/these-are-some-of-the-reasons-us-prisoners-wind-up-insolitary-confinement; Nicholas D. Mirzoeff, ‘Reckless Eyeballing’: Why Freddie Gray Was Killed, HOW TO
SEE THE WORLD (May 20, 2015), https://wp.nyu.edu/howtoseetheworld/2015/05/30/auto-draft-46/ (“Under
slavery, [‘reckless eyeballing’] meant making any eye contact with a person in authority. Under
segregation, it referred to any alleged look at a white woman, part of Jim Crow’s terror. Today, it is a tool
of the prison-industrial complex, where ‘don’t eyeball me’ is a standard command.”).
52
ACLU OF NEV. ET AL., UNLOCKING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: ENDING EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEVADA
STATE PRISONS 24 (2017).
53
Id.
54
ALLISON HASTINGS ET AL., NAT’L PREA RES. CTR., KEEPING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS SAFE UNDER
PREA: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO THE USE OF SEGREGATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 5 (2015).
55
Kenneth L. Appelbaum, American Psychiatry Should Join the Call to Abolish Solitary Confinement, 43 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 406, 408 (2015).
56
The NPRC (National PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) Resource Center), “a joint project of the
federal Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, issued a report in
April 2015.” Id. at 407.
57
HASTINGS ET AL., supra note 54, at 5.
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EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS

The effects of solitary confinement have been recognized by the courts for over a
century.58 Moreover, it is well established among the scientific and medical communities
that placing persons suffering from mental illness in solitary confinement exacerbates
their illness, typically resulting in serious psychological and physiological harm.59 Social
relationships play a crucial role in maintaining the well-being and health of humans.60
Since at least the 1970s, an extensive body of research has repeatedly shown the adverse
psychological and physiological effects, including increased mortality, of social isolation
outside of correctional settings.61 There is no reason to believe prisoners are immune
from these effects.
A.

Prolonged Solitary Confinement for Mentally Ill Prisoners Causes Serious
Psychological Harm

“Solitary confinement literally drives men mad,” former Justice Kennedy told the
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and Federal Government in
2015.62 Indeed, prolonged solitary confinement “may press the outer bounds of what
most humans can psychologically tolerate.”63 The toll solitary confinement takes on
mental health is well documented, with research consistently and unequivocally
establishing that solitary confinement causes serious psychological harm.64
Strikingly consistent psychiatric symptoms among prisoners in isolation include:
overwhelming anxiety and depression; hypersensitivity to external stimuli; perceptual
distortions, illusions, and hallucinations; severe panic attacks; difficulty in thinking,
concentration, and memory; intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts that
prisoners resist but cannot block out; overt paranoia; and problems with impulse

58

See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (recognizing the serious objections to prolonged solitary
confinement, the Court wrote that the effects on prisoners were grave, including violent insanity and
suicide).
59
Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 130. There is one
controversial study released in 2010, known as the “Colorado Study,” that came to a different conclusion;
however, it is widely criticized for its methodology, with two prominent scholars in the field addressing the
“fatal flaws” of the study extensively. MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ONE YEAR
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION 78 (2010); see
also Stuart Grassian & Terry Kupers, The Colorado Study vs. The Reality of Supermax Confinement, 13
CORR. MENTAL HEALTH REP. 1, 6–11 (2011) (debunking the Colorado Study and revealing its fatal flaws).
60
Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 296–97; James S. House et al., Social
Relationships and Health, 241 SCI. 540, 540–45 (1988).
61
See, e.g., Bennion, supra note 9, at 757–59; Paul Gendreau et al., Changes in EEG Alpha Frequency and
Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 54, 54 (1972); Haney,
Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 130–32; Haney, Restricting
Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 288–95; G.D. Scott & Paul Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of
Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum Security Prison, 14 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 337, 339 (1969).
62
Jean Casella, Supreme Court Justice Kennedy: “Solitary Confinement Literally Drives Men Mad,”
SOLITARY WATCH (Mar. 25, 2015), http://solitarywatch.com/2015/03/25/supreme-court-justice-kennedycorrections-system-is-broken-and-solitary-confinement-literally-drives-men-mad/.
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Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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control.65 Furthermore, studies show that without normal and positive environmental
interactions, including exposure to natural light, outdoor sounds, and varying colors,
certain cognitive functions go underutilized, resulting in a decrease of mental alertness,
concentration, and the ability to plan.66
While it is abundantly clear that solitary confinement can take a serious mental
toll on any prisoner, prisoners with mental illnesses are at greater risk of having their
suffering “deepen into something more permanent and disabling.”67 Psychologist Craig
Haney notes:
Empirical research on solitary and supermax-like confinement has
consistently and unequivocally documented the harmful consequences of
living in these kinds of environments . . . . Evidence of these negative
psychological effects come from person accounts, descriptive studies, and
systemic research . . . conducted over a period of four decades, by
researchers from several different continents.68
Some lower courts have recognized that severe psychological harm results from
placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement.69 Indiana Protection & Advocacy
Services Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction highlighted
the very real nature of psychological pain caused by decompensation (an exacerbation of
mental illness).70 The court described psychological pain as “pain and suffering
associated with feeling depressed, anxious, having nightmares, memory problems,
worries, and anxieties,” asserting that “[p]sychological pain exists. It is real and it results
from many of the symptoms which are associated with the mentally ill.”71 The court
explained that psychological “pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating [it] can
reduce the chances of a mentally ill prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level
of functioning.”72
In Madrid v. Gomez, the District Court for the Northern District of California
wrote that solitary confinement “may press the outer borders of what most humans can
psychologically tolerate” and that placing mentally ill or psychologically vulnerable
people in such conditions “is the equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little
air to breathe.”73 However, the court also found that, although solitary confinement “will
65

Id. at 295; Grassian, supra note 21, at 335–38.
Scott & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 337–39. Although these studies focus on social isolation outside of
correctional settings, there is no reason to believe that prisoners are immune from such effects.
67
Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 142.
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Id. at 130.
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See, e.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 233 (3d Cir. 2017); Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977
(7th Cir. 2006); Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37
F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 37 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
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No. 1:08-cv-01317, 2012 WL 6738517, at *15–16 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
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Id. at *16, *21.
72
Id. at *16.
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889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Finely v. Huss, 723 F. App’x. 294 (2018)
(finding a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials placed in solitary a seriously
mentally ill prisoner who had swallowed a razor blade and engaged in behavior that required
hospitalization more than once); Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1095 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
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likely inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon most prisoners confined there for
more than brief periods,” for many of the prisoners the trauma does not appear to
“exceed[] the kind of generalized psychological pain that courts have found compatible
with the Eighth Amendment standards.”74
Even corrections officials have recognized the serious problems with placing
persons with mental illness in solitary confinement. In 2014, Rick Raemisch, Colorado’s
Chief of Corrections, decided to spend a night in one of Colorado’s solitary confinement
cells.75 Raemisch described his experience:
First thing you notice is that it’s anything but quiet. You’re immersed in a
drone of garbled noise—other inmates’ blaring TVs, distant conversations,
shouted arguments. I couldn’t make sense of any of it, and was left feeling
twitchy and paranoid. I kept waiting for the lights to turn off, to signal the
end of the day. But the lights did not shut off. I began to count the small
holes carved in the walls. Tiny grooves made by inmates who’d chipped
away at the cell as the cell chipped away at them. For a sound mind, those
are daunting circumstances. But every prison in America has become a
dumping ground for the mentally ill.76
The experiment prompted an “urgency for reform,” with Mr. Raemisch explaining that
“[i]f we can’t eliminate solitary confinement, at least we can strive greatly to reduce its
use” and that “doing anything less would be both counterproductive and inhumane.”77
Although severe psychological pain is not always recognized as sufficiently
serious to bring an Eighth Amendment claim, it is widely recognized as a side-effect of
prolonged solitary confinement and is exacerbated in people suffering from mental
illness.78
B.

Isolating Mentally Ill Prisoners in Prolonged Solitary Confinement Can Cause
Serious Physical Harm

The risk of serious physical harm faced by prisoners with mental illness in
solitary confinement is also well established. One scholar explained that:
[a]s a result of . . . [mental illness], such individuals are almost
pathologically stimulation seeking and incapable of tolerating stimulus
deprivation . . . . Many become floridly psychotic or so agitated that they
(concluding that the “placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in California’s segregated housing units
can and does cause serious psychological harm, including decompensation, exacerbation of mental illness,
inducement of psychosis, and increased risk of suicide”); Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (describing Texas
administrative segregation as “incubators of psychoses—seeding illness in otherwise healthy inmates and
exacerbating illness in those already suffering from mental infirmities”).
74
Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1265.
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Rick Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/opinion/my-night-in-solitary.html.
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engage in awful, grotesque behaviors. They cover themselves and their
cells with feces, they mutilate themselves; try to kill themselves.79
In Scarver v. Litscher, the court explained “[i]t is a fair inference that conditions at
Supermax aggravated the symptoms of [the prisoner’s] mental illness and by doing so
inflicted severe physical and especially mental suffering.”80 Physical harm can occur with
severity alongside psychological harm where a prisoner is exposed to prolonged solitary
confinement.
1.

Suicide and Self-Harm

Self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide are horrifically common in solitary
confinement units. In Palakovic v. Wetzel, the court recognized this, writing that the
damage to prisoners is not restricted to mental harm, but that “[p]hysical harm can also
result. Studies have documented high rates of suicide and self-mutilation amongst
inmates who have been subjected to solitary confinement.”81
Many prison suicides and attempted suicides are directly the result of serious
mental illness.82 On average, about half of successful suicides by prisoners occur among
those housed in solitary confinement.83 And the ways prisoners die in solitary are
gruesome. One prisoner recounts watching through the crack of his cell door an older
man in solitary slit his wrists, fill a Styrofoam cup with the blood, then fling his blood on
the glass of his cell door and around his room before he laid down and died.84 Another
prisoner “stood on top of the cement bunk and dove headfirst into the toilet, over and
over, until he crushed his skull in.”85 The amount of self-harm, such as “cutting” or
swallowing dangerous objects, is similarly horrific.86

79

Id. at 42 (internal citation omitted).
434 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (concluding that supermax confinement is “known to cause severe psychiatric
morbidity, disability, suffering and mortality,” resulting in a high number of suicide attempts).
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854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Williams v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549,
567–68 (3d Cir. 2017)); see also Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (referencing a DOJ
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has placed prisoners with serious mental-health needs at a substantial risk of continued pain and suffering,
decompensation, self-injurious behavior, and even death, and the court cannot close its eyes to this
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ABOLISH IT 102 (2017); Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 290, 294; see also
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (alleging that prison officials’ failure to
medicate mentally ill prisoner resulted in prisoner’s suicide); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1988)
(affirming injunction based on findings that state prison’s policies for the treatment of mentally ill prisoners
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A significant problem is that far too often the actions of mentally ill prisoners are
assumed to be volitional by corrections staff and courts alike. Some correctional mental
health staff are quick to see a prisoner’s actions as malingering or manipulation and thus
overlook mental illness.87 A prisoner housed at Tamms Correctional Center in Illinois
before it was closed cut one of his testicles from his body and hung it from a string on his
cell door.88 Rather than determining the prisoner was suffering from mental illness and
should be removed from solitary confinement, medical and staff members at the
institution labeled the prisoner a “manipulator who cuts himself to get what he wants.”89
More commonly, these self-harm acts are not voluntary at all. The so-called
“manipulation” prisoners accused of exhibiting in solitary confinement, such as selfmutilation, is not inconsistent with mental illness.90 There are countless stories of isolated
prisoners with mental illness inflicting self-harm to escape their cell, even if just for a trip
to medical.91 However, the behavior “can also — and simultaneously — be a symptom of
a major psychiatric disorder or a self-reinforcing behavior that requires a psychiatric
response.”92
The Seventh Circuit case Sanders v. Melvin, decided in October 2017, expressly
recognized that the determination that volitional harm cannot satisfy the “imminent risk
danger of serious . . . injury” standard associated with three strikes litigation is
inappropriate.93 In the case, Sanders suffered from severe mental illness and had been
kept in solitary for eight consecutive years, during which time he committed several acts
of self-harm and attempted suicide.94 The court found that the district court incorrectly
assumed that volitional harm cannot satisfy the statute, writing: “[I]t does not follow that
no volitional conduct satisfies the statute . . . . When the prospect of self-harm is a true
consequence of the condition that prompted the suit, a court should treat the allegation (if
true) as imminent physical injury.”95
These anecdotes and court decisions demonstrate the risk of physical harm
prisoners in isolation face in the form of suicide, suicidality, and self-harm. These risks
cannot be overstated and should be treated seriously by courts.
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Other Kinds of Physical Harm Suffered in Solitary Confinement

Many prisoners placed in solitary confinement, both prisoners living with mental
illness and those who do not suffer from mental illness, experience forms of physical
harm independent from self-harm and suicide. Among the most common physical
manifestations of extreme isolation include severe headaches, heart palpitations,
insomnia, extreme weight loss, and digestive problems.96 Other physiological
manifestations include abdominal pain and muscle pains in the neck and back, as well as
pain and pressure in the chest.97 Some of these physical manifestations are a result of the
“stress hormone” cortisol, which builds up in the body during extreme isolation.98
Additionally, there are theories that neural pathways in the brains of people
subjected to isolation physically change. Advances in technology, neurobiology, brain
chemistry, and other studies of the brain have established that the harms associated with
solitary confinement also tend to trigger detectable changes in neural pathways of the
brain.99 These changes can be accurately characterized as physical injury because they
adversely affect the physical nature and functioning of the sufferer’s brain.
Given the deprivation of meaningful social interaction, coupled with a severe lack
of environmental stimulation, people “become incapable of maintaining an adequate state
of alertness and attention,” and within days, scans of their brains may reflect “abnormal
pattern[s] characteristic of stupor and delirium.”100 Although such manifestations sound
like mental harm, the fact that these harms can be detected by brain scans implicate a
physiological harm. A growing body of literature shows that solitary confinement can
change brain activity, resulting in adverse symptoms, sometimes in as few as seven
days.101 Other studies show that “certain regions of the brain of people who experience
extreme psychological stress (like those in solitary confinement) literally diminish in
volume because the neural cells become shriveled.”102
More research still suggests that the different pathways for physical and
psychological pain share neural and computational mechanisms.103 Studies have shown
that higher levels of social support—something prisoners trapped in solitary confinement
96

Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 131–33; Smith,
supra note 30, at 488–89.
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S. McEwen, The Neurobiology of Stress: From Serendipity to Clinical Relevance, 886 BRAIN RES. 172, 173
(2000).
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are almost completely lacking—“are associated with lower levels of chronic pain . . .
[and] cardiac pain . . . In addition, people who are socially alienated are more prone to
physical ailments.”104 The conclusion is that “the social pain caused by isolation is not
metaphorical pain, but has a physical effect on brain activity.”105 Although this research
has largely taken place outside of a correctional setting, it nonetheless suggests the line
between physical and psychological pain is not clear, and that the social isolation may be
just as “painful” as physical pain.
There can be no question that solitary confinement places prisoners at enormous
risk of suffering serious psychological and physiological harms. Worse still, prisoners
with mental illness, who are already overrepresented in solitary, are at a greater risk to
these deleterious harms, which can be permanent. Part III demonstrates that the
psychological and physiological horrors of solitary are often linked, and therefore there
can be no bright line drawn between the two.
III.

BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM

There is a growing consensus among the psychology and psychiatry communities
that the distinction between psychological and physical harm is no longer accurate or
appropriate.106 Senator John McCain, who spent more than two years in isolation as a
prisoner of war in Vietnam, said that solitary is the worst form of mistreatment. 107 This
assertion comes “from a man who was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical
treatment for two broken arms, a broken leg, and chronic dysentery; and tortured to the
point of having an arm broken again.”108 A study of several former prisoners of the
Vietnam War reported that they all found social isolation to be at least as torturous and
agonizing as any physical abuse they experienced, possibly more agonizing.109
Research suggests that drawing a hard line between physical and psychological
pain is inappropriate in part because psychological harm can be just as painful, if not
more painful, than physical abuse.110 Perhaps this is why solitary confinement is so
commonly used for the specific purpose of torture. Studies have found that
“psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as physical
torture.”111 Many of the adverse effects of prolonged solitary confinement are strikingly
similar “to the acute reactions suffered by torture and trauma victims, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the kind of psychiatric sequelae that plague victims
of what are called deprivation and constraint torture techniques.”112
104
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Dr. Hernán Reyes, a specialist on the medical effects of detention, describes
solitary confinement as a method of torture that does not physically assault the body and
yet “entail[s] severe psychological pain and suffering and profoundly disrupt[s] the
senses and personality.”113 Psychological torture “should not be minimized under the
pretext that pain and suffering must be physical in order to be real.”114 Indeed, prolonged
solitary confinement “has been said to be the most difficult torment of all to
withstand.”115 If solitary confinement wreaks such psychological havoc so as to
potentially cause worse pain than physical abuse, prisoners already suffering from mental
illness in isolation are at risk of even more serious harm.
Neurobiological studies show that the physical and psychological effects of
solitary are intimately interconnected in ways that make a bright line distinction between
the two inappropriate. Two prominent professors and researchers in the field, Jules Lobel
and Huda Akil, write that “[n]euroscience at least muddies the distinction between bodily
injury and mental harm, and, in the future, it might negate it entirely.”116 In making this
assessment, Lobel and Akil discuss brain imaging and how emotional pain, such as
chronic anxiety and depression, can actually alter the brain structure and function.117 For
those who are isolated for lengthy periods of time, especially those with pre-existing
mental illness, the effects may be permanent.118 For example, Akil’s work suggests that
solitary confinement can “fundamentally alter the structure of the human brain in
profound and permanent ways.”119 She argues that one region of the brain that is
particularly susceptible to “fundamentally alter” is the hippocampus, which plays a major
role in memory and stress, and physically shrinks under “severe and sustained stress.”120
Notably, this physical damage can lead to mental harms, including “loss of emotional and
stress control, loss of stress regulation, . . . defects in memory, spatial orientation, and
other cognitive processes,” and, potentially, “lasting changes in mood, including severe
depression.”121 This work demonstrates that there is “clear biological evidence of the
overlap between physical and mental distress,” and supports the basic point that the line
between the two is blurry at best.122
Other laboratory studies have focused on the physiological effects of social
isolation on prisoners’ cortisol levels, which directly correlate to serious physiological
and psychological consequences.123 Cortisol, the “stress hormone,” is a regulatory
hormone that is released when the body is under stress, including stress as a result of
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isolation.124 Social isolation is associated with an overall elevated cortisol profile, which
has also been linked to general stress, neuroticism, and depression.125 Furthermore, high
levels of isolation are associated with negative cardiovascular, metabolic, and
neuroendocrine processes.126 Studies suggest that high levels of cortisol can increase
blood cholesterol, triglycerides, and blood pressure, which are common risk factors for
heart disease.127 Chronic elevated cortisol also increases the risk for depression, mental
illness, and lower life expectancy.128 Elevated cortisol levels cause systemic
inflammation, which wreaks havoc on the mind and body.129 When it comes to the
physiological response to extreme isolation of increased cortisol, it is simply impossible
to determine where the line should be drawn between physical and psychological harm.
They are deeply connected.
The harms solitary confinement has on human minds and bodies are many and
complex. The psychological horrors suffered by people in extreme isolation are no less
worthy of reprieve than serious physical harm and are often inextricably connected so as
to make a distinction unwarranted. However, as Part IV demonstrates, there exist
substantial barriers which make it incredibly difficult for prisoners in solitary
confinement suffering from mental illness to bring successful conditions of confinement
claims.
IV.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES: WHY DOES IT MATTER?

The idea that physical harm is somehow worse than psychological harm has
created substantial barriers to mentally ill prisoners seeking relief from their own
personal hell. First, courts have been “more reluctant to find [Eighth Amendment]
constitutional violations in the psychological conditions of solitary confinement rather
than in the physical conditions.”130 Additionally, various provisions of the PLRA serve as
a reminder that mental injury is not as worthy of reprieve as physical injury. The physical
injury requirement limits prisoner litigants’ ability to recover compensatory damages for
claims alleging only mental harm. Moreover, the PLRA’s distinction between physical
and psychological harm makes it extremely difficult for indigent litigants with three
strikes to bring a successful challenge because, as a threshold matter, they must prove
they are in imminent danger of serious bodily (i.e., physical harm). However, in a world
where physical and psychological harm were instead treated as similarly serious, these
barriers would not exist.
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The Eighth Amendment Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”131 If prolonged
solitary confinement is truly as awful as everyone, even correctional professionals,132
says it is for prisoners suffering from mental illness, then it is a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Indeed, a handful of courts have recognized that placing seriously
mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement risks causing mental pain that might rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment.133 Regardless, “courts, prison officials, and
legislators have been unwilling to recognize . . . significant risk of mental pain and
illness as constituting an Eighth Amendment Violation.”134
To win an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must establish both an objective
component—the seriousness of the challenged conditions—and a subjective
component—the mental state of the officials who are responsible for the conditions.135
There has been no shortage of Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary confinement.136
However, they have rarely succeeded.137 Lower courts have occasionally recognized
grave mental harm in the conditions of confinement context,138 but the Supreme Court
has never done so.139 Courts have instead focused on duration and the physical conditions
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of solitary confinement.140 As such, Eighth Amendment claims generally have
“succeeded only when a prisoner alleged a concurrent deprivation of a physical need.”141
The way courts treat psychological harm varies, but generally courts are more
reluctant to find constitutional violations in psychological conditions of solitary
confinement than in physical conditions.142 Even courts that have recognized the problem
with psychological harm seem to be more comfortable focusing on physical rather than
psychological pain.143 Physical conditions are visible, and more apparent to prison
officials, while psychological conditions are typically hidden in the minds of the
prisoners and are incapable of diagnosis by untrained observers. One scholar argues that
the reason for the lack of recognition of psychological pain is the “discounting of mental
pain in the United States’ approach to cruel and inhuman treatment,” as evidenced by the
PLRA provision denying damages for mental or emotional injury without a showing of
physical injury.144 Although courts have recognized that psychological harm can
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment,145 the failure to treat mental pain as
seriously as physical pain has limited such claims. Furthermore, Eighth Amendment
claims centering around psychological pain are often seen as feigned or exaggerated,146
so they are sometimes “limited or denied in the absence of observable physical injury.”147
Any legal claim to categorically prohibit the placement of prisoners with mental
illness in solitary confinement must be based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment. It
must allege that, taken together, the risks to mental and physical health from placement in
isolated confinement pose a substantial and unreasonable risk of serious harm.148 While
there are a handful of lower courts that have found mental harm to be sufficiently serious
in mentally ill prisoners to make a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, the reluctance of
See e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (considering both “degree of restriction” imposed
by particular solitary-confinement regime and its duration before concluding that plaintiff did not suffer an
“atypical, significant deprivation”).
141
Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1250, 1261 (2015).
142
See Rebman, supra note 87, at 607 n.358 (comparing the way that courts generally treat physical
conditions to the way that courts treat psychological conditions in the context of Eighth Amendment
claims).
143
See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364–65 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “[w]hile the prison
administration may punish [inmates], it may not do so in a manner that threatens the physical and mental
health of prisoners” and finding that placing a prisoner in a “dry cell” where he was refused access to
adequate sanitation was cruel and unusual; however, the analysis focused much more on the physical
conditions than on whether the conditions jeopardized the mental health of inmates in those conditions).
144
Lobel, supra note 134, at 133.
145
Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that strip search of male prisoners in
front of female guards made an Eighth Amendment claim if the search was “conducted in a harassing
manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain”); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Constitution does not countenance psychological torture merely because it fails to inflict
physical injury.”); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that “significant . . .
emotional injury” can constitute Eighth Amendment pain).
146
See supra Part II(B)(1) (discussing the tendency of prison officials to label prisoners as malingering).
147
Lobel, supra note 134, at 133 n.78.
148
Conditions of confinement are “a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment .
. . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)).
To prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, there must be a “substantial risk of serious harm” to
which prison officials were deliberately indifferent. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–36 (1994).
140
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courts to treat psychological harm the same as physical harm has led to limited success in
ensuring that prisoners suffering from mental illness are not subjected to extreme
isolation for prolonged periods of time.
Recognizing that the physical and psychological harm prisoners with mental
illness experience are not readily separable, and instead placing the harm on same level
of severity, would make such a claim under the Eighth Amendment easier to make—in
other words, the inquiry of whether the alleged ailment is sufficiently serious to warrant a
constitutional concern would be an easier question to answer if mental harm (short of
suicide and self-mutilation) was automatically considered serious. Courts and the
legislature alike should defer to the scientific community, which is in overwhelming
agreement that the physical and psychological effects of solitary confinement on
prisoners with mental illness are devastating.
B.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a 1996 federal statute, has made it
more difficult for prisoners to pursue legal claims in federal court and get meaningful
redress. First, § 1915(g), the three-strikes provision, forbids prisoners who have
accumulated three-strikes during previous litigation efforts from proceeding in forma
pauparis unless they are in imminent danger of serious bodily harm.149 Additionally, §
1997e(e), the physical injury requirement, limits the ability of prisoners alleging mental
injury to get meaningful redress by removing the possibility to recover compensatory
damages.150 Both sections perpetuate the misconception that physical harm is more
serious and worthier of redress than mental harm.
1.

Three Strikes Litigation

Recognizing that psychological harm can be just as serious, if not more serious
than physical harm would help protect some of the most vulnerable prisoners in solitary
confinement: those who have “three strikes.” Under the § 1915(g) of the PLRA, prisoners
may not proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) if the prisoner has brought three or more actions
or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim, “unless
the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 151 This constraint puts
many prisoners with mental illness who are confined to prolonged and extreme isolation
in a difficult position.
The federal IFP statute authorizes a waiver of up-front filing fees for bringing an
action or appeal in federal court.152 The ability to proceed IFP is critical for prisoners

149

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012).
151
§ 1915(g).
152
See § 1915(a)(1) (“Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees or security thereof, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security
therefor.”).
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attempting to bring civil claims.153 The filing fee for a civil action in a federal appellate
court is $505, while in district court it is $400.154 The three strikes provision forces some
prisoners to pay the filing fee upfront, which most prisoners cannot afford. If a prisoner
with three strikes does not have the money to pay upfront, the prisoner must prove that he
or she is in “imminent danger serious physical injury.”155 The legislature, by drawing a
bright line between physical and psychological harm when it enacted the PLRA, has
compounded the problem for prisoners held in solitary confinement and created an almost
insurmountable barrier for prisoners with mental illnesses.
Furthermore, it is quite easy for prisoners to rack up three strikes, especially
considering the relevant population: mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement as
discussed in Part I. Defining a strike as any claim that is frivolous, malicious, or
dismissed for failure to state a claim created a large net, capturing a wide range of
claims.156 There is also a lack of clarity in what constitutes such a claim. For example,
courts have found that claims of small monetary value may be frivolous. 157 In Nagy v.
FMC Butner, the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower court’s dismissal of a claim for $25 for a
lost coat as frivolous.158 While $25 for a coat may seem trivial to someone outside of a
prison context, to someone with very few personal possessions, a $25 coat may have
increased importance and significance. In another example, a complaint that repeated
allegations of a previous litigation was deemed abusive and malicious.159
Prisoners with mental illness in solitary confinement are also particularly
vulnerable to making mistakes that cause them to rack up strikes. First, solitary
confinement limits prisoners access to legal resources, making it substantially more
difficult for such prisoners to bring actions that successfully state a claim, even where
there is an objectively cognizable claim.160 Moreover, given the impacts of solitary
153

In practice, most civil litigation by prisoners is civil rights litigation. Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting
Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act and Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2001) (citing Eugene J. Kuzinski,
Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 362 n.10 (1998)).
154
Fee Schedule, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL.,
https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/FilingCases.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). Although this site is for one
U.S. district court and one federal court of appeals, the fees are the same across the country.
155
§ 1915(g).
156
For example, one court dismissed on appeal a prisoner’s claim that his eight-day placement in solitary
confinement arose to a liberty interest subject to due process. Two strikes were assessed against the
prisoner—one for the dismissal on appeal, and one for the dismissal below. Dehghani v. Vogelgesang, 229
F. App’x 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2007). In an immigrant detainee’s suit over conditions of confinement, the
court dismissed the claims of loud noise, constant light, noxious smells, and low room temperature as
frivolous. Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (E.D. Va. 1999). The plaintiff’s complaint for failure to
protect from assault was also deemed frivolous. Id.
157
Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2004).
158
Id.
159
Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F. Supp. 627, 629 (N.D. Ind. 1983); see also Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d
1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A]n IFP complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims
may be considered abusive and dismissed . . . .”).
160
Prisoners in solitary confinement have few privileges, including restricted or prohibited access to
general prison library services. Solitary Confinement: Fact Sheet, JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ONT. (Feb. 3,
2017), http://johnhoward.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Solitary-Confinement-FactSheet-Final.pdf.
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confinement on cognitive functions discussed earlier,161 coupled with a pre-existing
mental illness, it should come as no surprise that prisoners rack up strikes, especially
given the fact that courts will find repetitive litigation to be malicious, and “trivial”
litigation to be frivolous.162 By applying the three strikes provision to prisoners who seek
to bring civil rights actions and appeals, but who are unable to afford the filing fees, the
provision effectively denies such persons access to the courts.
2.

The Exception to the Three Strikes Provision

Although there is an exception to the three strikes provision for prisoners that are
in imminent danger of serious physical injury, courts are divided on what satisfies the
imminent danger of serious physical injury requirement, especially when it comes to
psychological harm. Some courts emphasize the difference between psychological and
physical injury and find that psychological harm “does not satisfy the requirement that [a
prisoner] be in ‘imminent danger of serious physical harm.’”163 In Watley v. Collins, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the imminent danger standard despite his
allegations that he was mentally ill and had been placed in supermax conditions as a
result of his misbehavior, which aggravated his mental illness and therefore his
misbehavior.164 The prisoner had attempted suicide, was maced, and engaged in behavior
that disturbed other prisoners, who then threw urine and feces at him.165 In Darvie v.
Countryman, the court characterized “anxiety, depression, stress, nausea,
hyperventilation, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, appetite loss, weight loss, etc.” as
“essentially emotional in nature” and not satisfying the physical harm requirement.166
Many courts find that even the risk of self-harm as the result of mental illness
does not satisfy the physical injury or imminent danger standard. In such cases, the courts
express concern that prisoners will try to escape the three strikes provision of the PLRA
by inflicting “imminent danger” on him or herself,167 supporting the proposition that
prisoners are often seen as feigning mental health issues in a prison context.168

161

See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1087 (3d Cir.
1995).
163
Bryan v. McCall, No. 5:15-871, 2016 WL 529574, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g) (2012)).
164
No. 1:06-cv-794, 2006 WL 3422996, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006).
165
Id.
166
No. 9:08-CV-0715, 2008 WL 2725071, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008).
167
See Pinson v. Pledger, No. CIV-15-319-F, 2016 WL 4534925, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 22) (collecting
cases), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Pinson v. FNU Pledger, No. CIV-15-0319-F, 2016
WL 4535044 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30), appeal dismissed, Pinson v. Pledger, No. 16-6272, 2016 WL 9665172
(10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016); Widmer v. Butler, No. 14-cv-874-NJR, 2014 WL 3932519, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug.
12, 2014) (holding that prisoner may not escape the three-strikes provision of the PLRA by inflicting
“imminent danger” upon himself); Pauline v. Mishner, No. 09-00182, 2009 WL 1505672, at *2 (D. Haw.
May 28, 2009) (“Although Plaintiff states that he has harmed himself again, may be suicidal, and may harm
others, Plaintiff has not shown that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed this
complaint.”); Cooper v. Bush, No. 3:06-cv-653-J-32TEM, 2006 WL 2054090, at *1 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 21,
2006) (holding that plaintiff's allegations that he will commit suicide, or that he has already attempted
suicide and will do so again, are insufficient to show imminent danger); Wallace v. Cockrell, No. 03-MC162
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Courts are reluctant to hold that pure “mental harm” can, on its own, satisfy the
requirement of § 1915(g).169 However, some courts have found that self-harm can satisfy
the injury requirement.170 The Seventh Circuit has been receptive to the idea that
exacerbation of mental illness leading to a high chance of self-harm or suicide can satisfy
the imminent danger of serious bodily injury requirement for a three-strikes prisoner.171
In July 2018, the court found that a mentally ill prisoner raised a “genuine concern that
the negative psychological effects of his segregation will drive him to self-harm. So
[Plaintiff] ha[d] plausibly alleged that his continued segregation place[d] him in
imminent danger of serious bodily injury.”172
While the Seventh Circuit’s more progressive view of what can satisfy §1915(g)
is an important step, it still draws a sharp line between psychological and physiological
harm, cementing the view that “mental anguish is not a serious physical injury.”173
Finding that only mentally ill prisoners who are in imminent danger of self-harming or
committing suicide satisfy § 1915(g) still promulgates the idea that physical harm or pain
is somehow worse than psychological pain. This represents a failure among courts, even
those most receptive to mentally ill prisoners’ challenges to solitary, to contend with the
fact that mental injury or pain can be just as debilitating and serious as physical injury or
pain, even absent suicidal actions.
3.

The Physical Injury Requirement

Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.”174 The physical injury requirement has been cabined by courts so that lawsuits
for injunctive and declaratory relief remain available to prisoner litigants alleging mental
injury.175 Additionally, punitive and nominal damages generally remain available.176
However, such damages are often ineffective at redressing the harm prisoners with
mental illness in solitary face. First, courts have not reached a consensus over whether a
98-K, 2003 WL 22961212, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003) (holding that a prisoner’s claim that he was
suicidal “cannot create the imminent danger so as to escape the three strikes provision of the PLRA”).
168
See supra Part II(B)(1) (discussing the tendency of prison officials to label prisoners as malingering or
feigning).
169
See Dye v. Bartow, No. 06-C-0634, 2007 WL 1168771, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 17, 2007) (opining that
“the plaintiff may be in imminent danger of serious mental harm . . . [and] plaintiff will be permitted to
proceed in forma pauperis in this action” only after discussing the physically life-threatening side effects of
his mental illness, including dehydration and weight loss).
170
See Settle v. Phillips, No. 3:16-CV-250-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 3080810, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 31, 2016)
(prisoner with significant mental-health problems who alleged that his seventeen years in solitary
confinement placed him at risk of serious physical injury to himself was deemed to be in imminent danger
so as to satisfy § 1915(g)).
171
Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018); Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir.
2017); Gilbert-Mitchell v. Lappin, No. 06-741-MJR, 2008 WL 4545343, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2008).
172
Wallace, 895 F.3d at 485 (citing Sanders, 873 F.3d at 960).
173
Thompson v. Patterson, No. 12-0086-KD-M, 2012 WL 3257802, at *3 (S.D. Ala. July 11, 2012).
174
42 U.S.C. § 1997(c) (2012).
175
Note, Developments in the Law of Mental Illness (pt. 1), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1151 (2008).
176
Id.
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prisoner must actually plead nominal damages.177 Additionally, nominal damages rarely
exceed one dollar.178 As for punitive damages, though a majority of circuit courts permit
the recovery in the absence of compensatory damages, some do not.179 Further, punitive
damages are never awarded as a matter of right, no matter how egregious the situation.180
Even in circuit courts that allow for punitive damages, the bar to recovery is nearly
insurmountable: a prisoner must prove that a defendant acted with malicious intent or
reckless indifference.181
In sum, compensatory damages are the most important backward-looking remedy,
and prisoners alleging only mental injury are barred from recovering them. 182 Because
the PLRA also severely limits the amount attorneys can recover in fee awards,183 the bar
on compensatory damages reduces the incentives for attorneys to take these cases,
creating yet another barrier to successful litigation. In denying compensatory damages for
mental or emotional harm, the PLRA physical injury requirement delivers a strong
message: mental pain is not as worthy of reprieve as physical harm.
C.

No Relief for Prisoners in Solitary Confinement Suffering from Mental Illness

While a few states and some judges have acknowledged the horrors that prisoners
suffering from mental illness face in solitary confinement, the vast majority of prisoners
are denied relief.
In February of 2016, the Indiana Department of Corrections reached a settlement
in a case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana and the Indiana
Protection and Advocacy Services Commission on behalf of prisoners in solitary
confinement.184 The settlement prohibits, with some exceptions, the placement of
individuals with serious mental illness in solitary confinement.185 While these changes
177

Alison Cohn, Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and Punitive Damages
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 299, 309 (2006).
178
James Pfander, A Nominal Solution to Qualified Immunity, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1602, 1610 n.40 (2011).
179
See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 1999); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d
1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
180
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51–52 (1983).
181
Id. at 56.
182
While circuit courts are split as to whether Congress intended § 1997e(e) to apply to constitutional
claims, which presumably would encompass the Eighth Amendment, the analysis is generally in regard to
First Amendment violations. Compare Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that § 1997e(e) extends to First Amendment claims), Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374–75 (5th Cir.
2005), Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004), Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 875–76
(10th Cir. 2001), Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2000), with Wilcox v. Brown, 877
F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that prisoners may seek compensatory damages when prison
officials violate their First Amendment rights), Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016), King v.
Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015), Toliver v. City of New York, 530 F. App’x 90, 93 n.2 (2d Cir.
2013), Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999), Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1998).
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42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012).
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Jack Denton, Settlement Limits Solitary Confinement for People with Mental Illness in Indiana’s
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match what a few other states have done,186 “declining to torture the mentally ill is a low
bar.”187 Other states, including Colorado, Massachusetts, and New York also have passed
legislation that bans the placement of people with serious mental illness in solitary
confinement.188 In addition to state-wide initiatives, there is some case law suggesting
that solitary confinement might be inappropriate for people with mental illness.189
Settlement agreements, legislative initiatives, and litigation efforts do not
necessarily mean change is imminent for mentally ill prisoners. In Alabama, despite a
court directive issued in June 2017 to remove prisoners with serious mental illness from
solitary confinement absent extenuating circumstances,190 two random inspections in
December 2017 and January 2018 revealed 152 prisoners with a “serious mental illness”
in such conditions.191 In Colorado, a 2014 law prohibits placing people with serious
mental illness in solitary cells.192 However, in 2016, a state auditor found 45 of the 326
people in shorter-term disciplinary segregation had serious mental illness.193 The report
revealed that the department did not test whether people had mental illness before
isolating them, so the actual number of people with mental illness in isolation was likely
higher than what the report suggested.194 Additionally, following the 2016 report, over
about a six-month period, three prisoners in Colorado with serious mental illness ended
up in long-term solitary.195 Six inmates were not removed from solitary within thirty days
after staff discovered they suffered from mental illness, and thirty-six were held in
disciplinary segregation for over two months.196
Not a single legal or advocacy effort has led to the conclusion that the placement
of prisoners suffering from mental illness in prolonged solitary confinement is a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment. This leaves the door open for exceptions, which is
unacceptable given the overwhelming scientific consensus of what inevitably happens to
people with mental illness in solitary confinement. Furthermore, these state-wide
initiatives, settlement agreements, and cases impact just a fraction of the mentally ill
prisoners trapped in solitary.
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CONCLUSION

Being human is relational, plain and simple. We exist in relationship to
one another, to ideas, and to the world. It’s the most essential thing about
us as a species: how we realize our potential as individuals and create
meaningful lives. Without that, we shrink. Day by day, we slowly die.197
For the tens of thousands of mentally ill prisoners currently deteriorating in
solitary confinement, the line between physical and psychological harm is a significant
obstacle between them and reprieve from the torture of solitary confinement. The effects
of solitary confinement, both physically and psychologically, on prisoners with mental
illness are well known, not just in the medical and scientific communities, but in the
corrections community at large. Their brains literally shrink in size. They mutilate their
bodies. They die.
Given the overwhelming research suggesting that psychological harm can be just
as, if not more, debilitating than physical harm, placing a mentally ill person in solitary
confinement should be a per se constitutional violation. Courts recognizing that placing
mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment would have
profound consequences. I do not trivialize the burden such a finding would have on the
prison system in the United States. Prisons would have an affirmative duty to perform
diligent mental health evaluations on every single prisoner before placing him or her in
solitary confinement. Furthermore, because it is well known that solitary confinement can
bring out mental health issues in prisoners, these mental health evaluations would need to
be conducted at frequent intervals. However, this seems to be a small price to pay to
prevent the incredible harm that such prisoners are sure to face when thrown in the
“hole”.
While a finding that solitary confinement is categorically inappropriate for
prisoners with mental illness would be preferable, at minimum courts should begin to
treat serious psychological harm with the same level of severity as physical harm so as to
remove some of the barriers prisoners with mental illness currently face in bringing
successful challenges to their placement in solitary confinement. By recognizing that the
line between serious physical and serious psychological harm is blurry, courts could stop
making determinations they are simply not qualified to make. It is not only cruel, but
objectively dangerous, to prevent prisoners with mental illness from bringing a claim to
court to seek treatment or other help to reduce the effects of their illness, such as a
reprieve from extreme isolation. Removing the bright line courts have drawn between
physical and psychological harm would impact the ability of mentally ill prisoners to
bring civil rights claims challenging their extreme isolation, regardless of whether they
have accumulated three strikes, and regardless of whether their mental suffering is
accompanied a traditionally physical injury.
Prisons have unwillingly become mental health centers. More mentally ill people
are housed in prisons and jails than in actual mental health facilities.198 Perhaps a finding
that those suffering from mental illness do not belong in extreme isolation or a court
197
198

HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE, supra note 32, at xii.
See generally TORREY ET AL., supra note 42.
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system that effectively evaluates extreme psychological harm to those same prisoners
placed in solitary confinement would provide an impetus for Congress to take a harder
look at the mental health crisis in our country and invest in strong mental health systems
outside of prisons and jails.
As a country we can, and indeed we must, do better. Regardless of whether
mentally ill prisoners trapped in steel boxes are seriously suffering physically,
psychologically, or both, “evolving standards of [human] decency”199 should tell us that
such suffering is unacceptable.
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292

